Chicago Accident Law Blog

Illinois sexual abuse victims and their attorneys have experienced progress and setbacks in attempts to receive just compensation for their injuries-many of which are catastrophic and permanent.

...735 ILCS 5/8-2801 protects victims of sexual abuse having to defend against evidence of other sexual behavior. This is extremely important because victims do not want to have their whole history of sexual activity put under a public spotlight in order to pursue a legitimate claim of sexual abuse. Effective January 1, 2010.

...735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 increased the time victims of childhood sexual abuse have to file suit to 10 years after victim reaches 18 or 5 years from the date the victim discovers both (1) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse. This is also good news for victims since they frequently don't recognize until well after they reach 18 that their psychological and/or emotional injuries were caused as a result of the sexual abuse they suffered as children. Effective July 24, 2003.

...735 ILCS 5/13-202.3 eliminates the 2 year statute of limitations for adult victims of sexual if they are subject to "threats, intimidation, manipulation or fraud perpetrated by the perpetrator." Efffective January 1, 2008.

...Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 917 N.E. 2d 475 (2009). The Illinois Supreme Court held that the increased statute of limitations contained in 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (see above) does not resurrect a claim that was already barred by a prior statute of limitations when when the new statute of limitations became effective-July 24, 2003. The court based its holding on the Ill. Const. 1970, Art. I Sec. 12. ruling "once a statute of limitations has expired, the defendant has a vested right to invoke the bar of the limitations period as a defense to the cause of action..." Basically, once a statute of limitations has expired the cause of action cannot be resurrected by an act of the legislature without violating the Illinois State Constitution. This ruling has precluded many legitimate claims of childhood sexual abuse from proceeding, but its effect through time will be diminished.

...In re Detention of Tommy O. Hardin, 2010 WL 2524155, the Illinois Supreme Court held that probable cause standard was met under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq.) adopting a more relaxed standard employed by the state of Wisconsin in State v. Watson, 227 Wisc. 167, 595 N.W. 2d 403 (1999). The court has made the burden on the state less onerous when they seek to meet probable cause to have a trial on whether civil commitment is appropriate after a sexual abuse offender has completed his or her term of incarceration. Good news for society-pedophiles have a high rate of recidivism.

Illinois sexual abuse victims and their lawyers are now protected against having to defend against evidence of other sexual behavior or sexual predisposition. Effective January 1, 2010, 735 ILCS 5/8-2801 provides that: "Admissibility of evidence; prior sexual activity or reputation.
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any civil proceeding except as provided in subsection (b) and (c):
(1) evidence offered to prove that any victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or
(2) evidence to prove any victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) in a civil case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible under this Act:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or otheer physical evidence; and
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent by the victim.

Subsection (c) deals with the procedure to determine admissibility, essentially a motion filed fourteen days before trial with an in camera hearing with the record sealed. This addition to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure essentially follows Rule 412 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The Notes on Rule 412 state: The rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding process. By affording victims protection in most instances, the rule also encourages victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal proceedings.

This addition to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure is welcome for victims of sexual abuse. No longer will they be cross examined regarding other sexual behavior or their sexual predispositions. This will as the notes to Rule 412 reveal encourage victims to institute or participate in legal proceedings without fear of embarrassment or sexual stereotyping. Illinois sexual abuse victims will no longer have to fear public disclosure of intimate sexual details that have no bearing on the allegations of sexual abuse that are being litigated. This is very good news for Illinois sexual abuse victims and will now freely allow them to access the legal system for redress without submitting their entire life's sexual history to public scrutiny.

Illinois sexual abuse victims and their attorneys were severely disappointed with the September 24, 2009, Illinois Supreme Court decision in Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 917 N.E. 2d 475. The court framed the issue as: "..whether section 13-202.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2), may be applied to permit an action for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse to proceed where that action would otherwise have been time-barred under the law as it existed when the amendment took effect."

The defendant priest's lawyer contended that because plaintiff's cause of action was already time-barred under the prior law years before the the 2003 amendments took effect, allowing the lawsuit to go forward now would deprive him of a vested right in violation of the due process protections of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, Art. I Sec. 12). The Illinois Supreme Court agreed stating: "once a statute of limitations has expired, the defendant has a vested right to invoke the bar of the limitations period as a defense to a cause of action. That right cannot be taken away by the legislature without offending the due process protections of our state's constitution."

This decision has caused me to discontinue representation of several meritorious claims of my clients. The court did not dwell on the thoughtful analysis of two appellate court opinions that discussed the retroactivity analysis between the "vested rights" and "legislative intent" approach to determining whether a claim is time-barred. I have written two earlier blogs on this topic. This is a sad day for victims of sexual abuse in Illinois.

I understand the Illinois Supreme Court's reason for reaching the decision they did. Namely, application of the 2003 amendment to a time-barred claim to breathe new life into it violates the due process clause of our state's constitution (Ill. Const. Art. I, Sec. 12). I honestly believe they signed the opinion holding their nose, and they said as much; "Defendants in this case have elected to invoke the defense, and they alone are responsisible for that decision and its impact on plaintiff's ability to seek relief through the courts." I regretfully respect the high court's decision and feel sorry for the victim. The Catholic Church's tactic in bringing about the pain to this victim, many other victims, and even our Supreme Court is deeply disturbing!

As an Illinois lawyer representing victims of childhood sexual abuse I was pleased with the recent ruling in Doe v. Hinsdale Township High School District, 388 Ill. App. 3d 995, 905 N.E. 2d 343 (2009). In Doe, a female high school student brought action for personal injuries based upon childhood sexual abuse against school, principal, and superintendent. The trial judge in Du Page county dismissed student's claims against school, principal and superintendent based on the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/8-101, ruling that a suit against the school or any of its employees must be brought within the one year statute of limitations for suits against governmental entities or their employees. The issue on appeal was whether the one year statute of limitations for governmental bodies and their employees governed this action or whether the five year statute of limitations for Childhood Sexual Abuse, 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 applied.

The Appellate Court in Doe, stated:

In resolving which statute apples, we note that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent.

905 N.E. 2d at 347. The reviewing court concluded that:

In this case, section 13-202.2(b) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) begins with the language "notwithstanding any other provision of law." In using this language, the legislature clearly intended section 13-202.2 of the Code to control over other provisions of law, such as section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act, which would otherwise bar the plaintiff's action.

905 N.E. 2d at 348.

This ruling is a clear victory for victim's of childhood sexual abuse in that it does not limit to one year the time frame a victim can sue a governmental employee or governmental entity regarding any duties they may have to children under their care and supervision for sexual abuse by others they employ or control. This decision while respecting the statutory language, also furthers the legislative intent in allowing children adequate time to assess the damage done to them by the pedophile. From a practical standpoint it is frequently only the employer of the pedophile who can pay damages to the sexually abused victim. Further, it provides a clear incentive for schools or other organizations that deal with children on a regular basis to have a clear set of guidelines for what is and is not appropriate relationships between children and their teachers, coaches or others who interact with them on a regular basis. The bottom line is that this decision will insure that school districts, park districts, and others dealing with children will have to be vigilant regarding the screening and monitoring of the individuals who came into contact with the children that have been entrusted to their care. This is a good thing!

Illinois sexual abuse victims through their lawyers won another victory in the Appellate Court regarding application of the statute of limitaions. In M.K. v. L.C. et al, 2009 WL 103616, released January 9-09, the Third District Appellate Court chose to follow the holding of an opinion released last year, Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d 782, 885 N.E. 2d 376 (2008), where the Fifth District held that the 2003 amendment to the Childhood Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations, 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b), was to be applied retroactively. Essentially this means that even if the statute of repose or limitations had expired before the 2003 amendment, the amendment controls, and the action may be mantained.

While this case and the Doe case will be reviewed by the Illinois Supreme Court, I am personally hopeful that these two thoughtful opinions by our Appellate Court will provide the framework and legal analysis that will lead the Justices to conclude that retroactive application of 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b), is the law of the State of Illinois. In an earlier blog, March 21-08, I conducted a detailed analysis of the "legislative Intent" and "vested rights" appraoch to applying statutes of repose and limitations retroactively. The bottom line is that our legislature has passed a statute that allows childhood sexual abuse victims longer times to file their suits because the damage from the sexual abuse does not always manifest itself within two years of reaching majority, this legislative determination should not be overruled by the judicial branch without a compelling right being violated. I see none, and so do two Appellate Courts in Illinois

As an Illinois attorney representing victims of sexual abuse I was very encouraged by the verdict returned yesterdy in St. Clair County awarding a former altar by $5 million against the Belleville Archdiocese. This is one of the most significant verdicts in Illinois involving childhood sexual abuse, and it included $2.6 million in punitive damages and $2.4 million in compensatory damages. The jury found that the diocese conspired to hush sex abuse allegations and allowed the priest free rein in the diocese even after church officials knew he couldn't control his sexual urges toward young boys and girls.

Verdicts like this encourges other victims to come forward and clearly forces entities that are responsible for the care of our children to see that those in their employment are properly and promptly disciplined so as to prevent future acts of childhoood sexual abuse. One of the jurors who was interviewed after the verdict stated that the actions of the diocese were "appalling" and added "they kept placing Father Kownacki in the parishes." A former diocesan official at the Belleville Archdioces testified that prior allegations concerning Father Kownacki were hushed up and that the victims were treated as "dirty laundry." According to the evidence at trial it took more than 20 years for Kownacki to be removed from active ministry.

Since the abuse took place in the 1960's the victim has had a difficult time defeating the statutue of limitations defenses that have been use for years to have these complaints dismissed. Recently, the Applellate Court for the Fifth District stated: "(w)e conclude that section 13-202.2(e) evinces a clear legislative intent that the 2003 amendment apply to all cases filed on or after its effective date, including those in which the allegations of abuse relate to events that preceded the amendment." Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d 782, 792, 885 N.E. 2d 376, 384 (2008). This decision should allow victims to step forward and hold those accountable for sexual abuse that took place many years ago that were previously dismissed based on the statute of limitations. This verdict demonstates that it can and will be done!

Illinois children who are sexually or physically abused on school buses operated by school districts are now afforded the same legal protections that apply to passengers on common carriers. In Green v. Carlinville School District, 381 Ill. App. 3d 207, 887 N.E. 2d 451 (2008), the trial court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment holding that the school district was not operating as a common carrier while transporting children on it school buses, and therefore did not owe a heightened duty of care to children sexually abused by its driver. In reversing the trial court, the Appellate Court Fourth District relied upon the Illinois Supreme Court's 1882 decision in Chicago and Eastern Railroad v. Flexman, 103 Ill. 546, where the Supreme Court stated: "..the contract which existed between appellant as a common carrier and appellee as a passenger, was a guaranty on behalf of the carrier that appellee should be protected against personal injury from the agents or servants of appellant in charge of the train. It alone had the power of removal, and justice demands that it should be held responsible for their wrongful acts toward passengers while in charge of the train." The Green court in interpretting the Flexman decision stated: "Our supreme court has long held that if an employee of a common carrier intentionally injures a passenger, the common carrier is liable for the passenger's injuries, even if the employee's actions were not in his actual or apparent scope of authority." 381 Ill. App. 3d 207, 887 N.E. 2d 451, 456 (2008).

The decision in Green is very significant because it directly holds: ".. that school districts that operate school buses owe their students the highest degree of care to the same extent common carriers owe their passengers the highest degree of care." 887 N.E. 2d at 456. Therefore, if a school bus driver intentionally assaults a child on the school bus physically or sexually, the school district is liable even though clearly outside the scope of employment. This decison requires school districts to conduct criminal background checks on its employees prior to hiring them as is required by 105 ILCS 5/34-18.5 and to vigilant in supervising its employees that it places in charge of children. Protection of children is an interest that deserves protection!

Illinois childhood sexual abuse victims were given a chance to bring their claims for injuries by an opinion by the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District that was released March 7, 2008, Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d 782, 885 N.E. 2d 376. Essentially the court held that the statute of limitations for bringing a claim for childhood sexual abuse that became effective on July 24, 2003, and which in summary increased the statute of limitaions to 5 years from "the date the person abuse discovers or through the use of reasonable deligence should discover both (i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse, 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2, could apply to a claim that the previous statute of limitations had already barred. The Illinois legislature passed this legislation in direct response to an opinion by the Illinois Supreme Court in 2000 which held that there is no requirement that a plaintiff must know the full extent of his injuries before the statute of limitations begins to run, and further held that Illinois law presumes an injury from an allegation of sexual abuse, Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d. 603, 727 N.E. 2d 217 (2000).

In 2006 two different Illinois Appellate Court decisions intrepretting 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2, reached the same conclusion "once a statute of limitations has expired, the defendant has a vested right to invoke the bar of the limitations period as a defense to a cause of action. That right cannot be taken away by the legislature wothout offending the due process protections of our state's constitution." Kuch v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 366 Ill. App. 3d 309, 313, 851 N.E. 2d 233, 236 (2006); see also Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield, 367 Ill. App. 3d 997, 857 N.E. 2d 737 (2006). Both cases cited to a 1997 decision by the Illinois Supreme Court that held that once a statute of repose has extinguished a cause of action, defendant has a vested right under the due process clause of the State Constitution to invoke the statutory repose period, even after the repose period was abolished by the legislature. M.E.H. v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d 207, 685 N.E. 2d 335 (1997).

The issue the court recently wrestled with In Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, (2008), was statutory retroactivity and whether to use the "vested rights approach" or the "legislative intent approach."
The court described the vested rights approach as "the law applied was that which was in effect at the time of the appeal unless the use of that law somehow interfered with a vested right...., with the vested rights approach the legislature's intent regarding retroactivity was not relevant." The court stated that "under the legislative intent approach, the presumption is against retroactive application of the statutory changes unless the legislature clearly indicates an intent that the amendments be so applied."

Continue reading "Illinois Childhood Sexual Abuse Victims Get A Break" »

Illinois sexual abuse victims often confront confusing statute of limitations issues when bringing claims for chilhood sexual abuse. The Illinois Supreme Court held that under the common law discovery rule governing when a statute of limitations commences, there is no requirement that plaintiff must know the full extent of her injuries before the applicable statute of limitations begins to run. Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 727 N.E. 2d 217 (2000).

Plaintiff in Clay was born in 1964, sexually abused on hundreds of ocassions in 1972 and 1973, and filed suit against Kuhl and his religious order in 1996. Plaintiff alleged that it was not until 1994 that she first became aware that Kuhl's misconduct caused her injuries.

The defendants moved to dismiss complaint pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5), arguing that the time for filing suit expired on March 31, 1984, when she turned 20 years old. Illinois law allows minors to bring suit within two years of reaching majority; 18 years old being majority in Illinois, 735 ILCS 5/13-211. The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appealed and Illinois Appellate Court reversed the dismissal, Clay v. Kuhl, 301 Ill. App. 3d 694, 704 N.E. 2d 875. The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Court and affirmed the trial court's dismissal.

In arguments before the Illinois Supreme Court plaintiff contended that application of the discovery rule is necessary because plaintiff did not realize the full extent of her injuries until well after her 20th birthday. The discovery rule states that a party's cause of action accrues when the party knows or reasonably should know of an injury and that the injury was wrongfully caused. Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 430 N.E. 2d 976 (1981).

Continue reading "Illinois Sexual Abuse Victims Abused Again" »